Patriots go for it on fourth

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Football is full of controversy. Perhaps the most controversial play call of this season happened in the November matchup between the Patriots and Colts. After giving up a fourth quarter 17 point lead, the Patriots were stopped on their 28 yard line, 4th down, with 2 more to go. The Patriots coach, Bil Belichick, decided to go for it. Unfortunately, the Patriots did not get the first down and they lost the game. Why did Belichick decide to go for it when a punt seemed like a safer play? The following week, ESPN’s NFL Sunday Countdown analyzed the decision. Belichick gos-for-it on 4th 18% of the time compared to a league average of 15%. He is also more successful, converting 59% compared to a league average of 48%. In an earlier interview, Belichick cited an academic paper written by Berkley Economics professor David Romer, “A Dynamic-Programming Analysis of Football Strategy” February 2003. In the paper, Romer analyzes two years of NFL play data to calculate 4th down play success probabilities and determined that NFL should go-for-it on fourth more frequently to maximize their winning probability. Belichick’s decision has since been analyzed extensively and the numbers all seem to support his decision, but you can’t win all the time.

References:
“DO FIRMS MAXIMIZE? EVIDENCE FROM PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL” – David Romer, University of California, Berkeley, July 2005
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“Pats-Colts analysis/reaction: The 4th-down call” – November 16, 2009
<< http://www.patriots.com/news/index.cfm?ac=generalnewsdetail&pid=40326&pcid=41&rss=1>>

“Defending Belichick’s Fourth-Down Decision” – November 16, 2009
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“ZEUS Computer Program Supports Belichick’s Fourth-Down Bid”
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“Number-crunchers: Bill Belichick's 4th-down gamble was the right call”
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“Belichick's 4th Down Decision vs the Colts”
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“David Romer”
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“Fourth-down analysis met with skepticism”
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